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Since the 1990s, the European Union has started to enter a policy area that
until then had been one of the exclusive prerogatives of the nation state: the
public dealing with Europe’s bloody past. Within a few years the European
Parliament passed several resolutions dealing particularly with the
commemoration of human rights violations that took place on the territory
of the EU while the European Commission made several funding
instruments available aimed at using the realm of memory as a mechanism
of public sphere formation. While European efforts for transnational
historical remembrance have focused almost exclusively on the Holocaust
and National Socialism as well as Stalinism, the EU remains curiously quiet
about the memories of imperialism and colonialism. This essay analyzes the
conflictual memory constellations at the European level with the aim of
explaining why European memory politics are characterized by a sustained
focus on specific time periods on the one hand and amnesia on the other.
By closely analyzing protocols of the European Parliament (EP), the Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) Council and European Council meetings using
frame analysis, the essay digs deep into the complex dynamics lying at the
heart of memory contests within the EU and provides a differentiated view
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on the ways in which memory is continuously dislocated, via resistance,
consensus-making and conflict.
Introduction
During a lecture at Regent’s University in London on 18 September 2013, the
then President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy said: “In
Europe, we sometimes overlook the weight of recent history; how people in
some parts of the world look at us” (Van Rompuy 2013). His remark
sparked a vivid debate within the European Council on what is often called
“Europe’s forgotten past” or – in other words – Europe’s role as a colonial
and imperial power during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Surpris-
ingly, debates focused very little on what Van Rompuy called the “weight
of recent history” – human rights violations committed by member states of
the European Union during the colonial period. Instead, many politicians
commented on the fact that the historical legacy of colonial relations allows
many countries to tie their criticisms of the EU and its member states to accu-
sations of neo-colonialism that are not levelled against other actors even if
these actors sometimes have similar policies.1 What remained curiously
absent in all discussions was the acknowledgment of the painful memory
that had marked the relations between the EU and its former colonies for
decades. It is exactly this memory that Van Rompuy refers to and that influ-
ences contemporary international relations more than many politicians are
prepared to admit. This is surprising given that the EU in other contexts
has been much less hesitant to address its dark past. One could argue in
fact that it has built its raison d’être around the experience of oppression
and coercion that many European citizens suffered during and after World
War II. The memory of these experiences had profoundly marked the EU
founding fathers and found their way into almost every speech given by
early European actors (Sierp 2014). The proposal in 1950 by French
foreign minister Robert Schuman to pool the French and German coal and
steel production and thus the output of two industries necessary to make
war was, on the one hand, aimed at ensuring future peaceful relations
between European countries and, on the other, at raising living standards
after the devastation of World War II. The latter was closely connected to a
third objective that nowadays is often forgotten when talking about the
Schuman Declaration: “the development of the African continent,” which
at the time was described as “one of its [the EU’s] essential tasks”
(Schuman 1950).
Europe’s identity and the EU’s history have been intrinsically linked to its
rule over the rest of the world. As Michelle Pace and Roberto Roccu write in
their introduction to this special issue: “Colonialism is silently inscribed in
1 One example being
the African Union’s
threats in 2014 to
boycott the EU–
Africa summit in
Brussels if Robert
Mugabe was not
invited to attend
(which led to an
invitation finally
being issued),
compared with
African countries’
much more moderate
reaction at the same
decision taken by the
US administration
when organizing the
Leaders’ Summit in
Washington months
later.
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the genes of the European integration project since its origins.” Most Euro-
pean member states were still colonial powers when the European Economic
Community – which turned into the EU – was founded in 1957 and some of
them still had colonial possessions when they joined years later (i.e. the UK
or Portugal). It is therefore all the more surprising that the memory of
oppression and slavery plays a limited role outside of the type of comments
quoted above. It has also not entered the European remembrance landscape
to the same extent as other human rights violations: this, despite the fact that
the EU, in the last decades, has become very active in using the realm of
memory as a mechanism for public sphere formation (Sierp 2014). How
selective and inward-looking those efforts have been becomes evident
when analyzing the scope of the resolutions passed by the European Parlia-
ment and the funding instruments made available by the European Commis-
sion. All European efforts for transnational historical remembrance have
focused almost exclusively on the Holocaust and National Socialism as
well as Stalinism. The EU remains curiously quiet about the memories of
imperialism and colonialism. Humanitarian catastrophes, civil wars and
border conflicts, state collapses, terror attacks and environmental and
climate catastrophes appear to the European public to have little to do
with this history.
How can this ambivalent selective relationship towards Europe’s “weight
of history” – as Van Rompuy calls it – be explained? Where does the
memory of colonialism emerge and where is it silenced? Which actors are
involved in this process? Can it be best described by amnesia, redirection
or atonement (Nicolaïdis 2015)? By analyzing the conflictual memory con-
stellations at the European level this essay aims to explain why EU
memory politics is characterized by a sustained focus on specific time
periods on the one hand and amnesia on the other. In doing so it discusses
the strategies followed by the EU on this matter in terms of Nicolaïdis’s
(2015) three approaches, amply discussed by Michelle Pace and Roberto
Roccu in the introduction to this special issue. The data has been selected
with a view on the main areas of memory activism within the European
Union relying on the EU data repository EURLex. It uses frame analysis in
order to analyze meeting protocols of the three main actors dealing with
memory politics on the European level: the European Parliament, the
Justice and Home Affairs Council and European Council meetings. The
essay focuses on the non-final versions of documents in order to dig deep
into the complex dynamics lying at the heart of memory contests within
the EU. It thus provides a differentiated view on the ways in which
memory is continuously dislocated, via resistance, consensus-making and
conflict.
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Colonialism and the European integration process: a case of redirection
Colonialism, the process of decolonization and European integration cannot
be disentangled. They were very closely interwoven processes that to a certain
extent depended on each other. For the early thinkers of European inte-
gration, the concept of “Eurafrique” or “Paneuropa” – a region that included
Europe, Africa and some areas of the Middle East – was part of the logical
continuation of the contemporary political situation in the interwar period.
The new aggregation would have been able to oppose itself to Panamerica,
Panrussia and Panpacifica and thus solidify the role of an alternative zone
of power (von Coudenhove-Kalergi 1923; Zischka 1951; see Dechamps
2009; Hansen and Jonsson 2014 for a general overview). This way of thinking
was modified after World War II with the onset of the second wave of deco-
lonization. The six countries that formed the nucleus that later was to become
the European Union were all located on the European continent. However,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and to a certain extent also Italy2 were
still colonial powers when the Rome treaties were signed in 1957 and they
managed to include their colonial possessions as associated to the newly
formed European Economic Community. Part IV of the EEC Treaty gave
the legal basis for the association of those territories, putting into practice
what Robert Schuman had announced already in 1950 as “one of its essential
tasks.” It was in particular France that until the 1960s nurtured the idea of
“Eurafrique” by potentially linking the two continents through common insti-
tutions (Bitsch and Bossuat 2005).
With the consolidation of the European Communities, French activism in
this direction waned. According to Giuliano Garavini (2013), it was in par-
ticular the liberation movements of the Third World together with the concur-
rent protest movements of the young and the working classes as well as the
evolving neo-Marxist intellectual currents that caused a shift in European dis-
course. These movements did not only create space for discussions of alterna-
tive forms of cooperation but also opened the doors for a reconsideration of
the damage caused to non-European nations during colonial times. However,
most activities were confined to development cooperation and the strengthen-
ing of economic ties. They were largely national in character. It took until
1971 before the European Commission put forward a specific request for
the launching of a common policy on cooperation and development that
would go beyond national plans (Commission 1971). When analyzing the
ensuing debates in the European Parliament, it becomes evident how
divided the member states were over this issue. They stubbornly resisted
any attempts at a joint policy of development and cooperation (European Par-
liament 1972), defying what Nicolaïdis (2015) called the “desire for continu-
ity and collective management of a colonial world… slipping out of the grasp
of its member states individually” (285–286). Arguably, it was only with the
2 Somalia was under
Italian trusteeship
until 1960.
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accession of the UK, the renegotiation of the Yaoundé Agreements in 1973
and the following signing of the Lomé Convention in February 1975 that a
major step forward in the creation of a real Community policy for what
was labeled “the South” was made. The 1980s then marked a new shift in
policy, moving away from the unconditionality of aid towards making it
dependent on some form of political cooperation (Garavini 2013, 191,
256). In Nicolaïdis’s (2015) terms, the process of transforming the ambitions
of former colonial powers from direct inclusion of their colonial territories
into the EEC towards loose cooperation can be described as “redirection.”
It is arguably no coincidence that this development went hand in hand with
the successive enlargements of the EC: “European nations learned to redirect
their ambition from without to within” (288).
While real progress was made on “Europeanizing” policies aimed at tying
former colonies closely to the EU’s member states, a similar development
regarding atonement for the crimes committed in those countries during the
colonization period could not be observed. Even if the origin of the special
relationship between the EC and its former colonies was in the background
of most policy decisions taken in this field, the memory of human rights viola-
tions during the period of colonialism remained invisible in official statements
and policy documents. The evolving political and economic ties with the
former colonies of Europe seemingly eclipsed all other aspects of the historical
relationship with those countries. A search in the EU documents repository
EUR-Lex using the search terms “Colon*” and “Empir*” for the period
1971 (after the Commission proposed a common policy for the first time)
to 2018 bring up not much more than lofty statements similar to the one by
Nils Muiznieks, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights,3
stressing that Europe must “fight the sort of afrophobia (dislike of black
people)4 that goes back to the days of colonialism and the slave trade”
(Agence Europe 2017).
References to colonialism and imperialism appear mainly in the context of
“environmental colonialism” or “agricultural colonialism,” describing the
process through which non-governmental organizations (NGOs), steered by
Western governments, put pressure on developing countries to not make
use of their raw materials while performing land-grabbing (Agence Europe
2015; European Parliament 2011a, 2011b). They also appear in the context
of accusations of a “neo-colonialist attitude” of the EU in relation to potential
new member states in the Mediterranean (Agence Europe 2018; European
Parliament 2012a), past experiences of existing member states under Com-
munism (European Parliament 2014a, 2014b, 2016) and in references to
some of the EU’s development policies and its neighbourhood policy (Euro-
pean Parliament 2011c, 2015; see also contribution by Langan and Price
this special issue). It has also featured prominently in the recent Brexit
debates, with the status of Gibraltar and Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the
3 The Council of
Europe is of course
not an EU institution
but remains the point
of reference for the
EU when it comes to
human rights issues.
4 Interesting here is
the avoidance of the
term “racism” as
commonly used to
denote “afrophobia.”
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island of Cyprus creating frictions between different member states (BBC
2018; Kouparanis 2017).
The term “colonialism” is clearly used – in some cases in one breath with
Nazism and Fascism – as a negative reference point for other policies. In
some instances, the connections made in this context can appear far-
fetched, i.e. when MEPs compare the EU’s austerity policy during the Greek
debt crisis to a modern form of colonialism in Europe (Figueiredo 2011;
Murphy 2012). What is being cut out in the process is the memory of this
specific time period. By becoming a sort of negative foil against which to
measure contemporary relationships with other states, recollections of the
colonial period are not only redirected but also moved to an abstract level.
This allows for the blending out of certain aspects, among them the human
rights violations that took place in the name of the colonizers.5
The EU and colonial crimes: A case of amnesia
In its Annual Human Rights Report 2002 the Council of the European Union
outrightly condemns colonial crimes, stating that “some effects of colonialism
which still persist today have caused immense suffering” and underlining that
“any act causing such suffering must be condemned, wherever and whenever
it occurred” (Council 2002, 253). Twelve years later, in 2014, it warns that
the continuous remembrance of human rights violations might hamper any
progress in the development of sustainable cooperation agreements
(Council 2014). In the final document on the relaunch of cooperation
between Africa and Europe adopted at the end of the EU–Africa summit in
early April 2014, the Council suggests that
the conflicts between African countries are for the most part overcome and that the
abuse and cruelty of European colonialism is of course not forgotten, but put to one
side in order to leave room for new forms of cooperation. (Council 2014)
The memory of colonial crimes is evidently classified as a potential hindrance
for the further development of (economic) ties with the African continent and
thus “put to one side” – a clear instance of intentional amnesia in order to
“break with the past” as described by Nicolaïdis (2015).
The Council’s ambivalent stance corresponds in large terms to the often
ambivalent, amnesic attitude of some of the former colonial powers. In
France, for example, a long tradition of historiography going from Ernest
Renan to Fernand Braudel and Pierre Nora explored and interpreted national
identity ignoring its colonial dimension, i.e. the political anthropology under-
lying the formation of a modern citizenship.6 The most visible outcome of this
5 The term human
rights in its legal sense
is of course rather
new. The principal
motives/justifications
in the nineteenth
century were (a) the
general economic
exploitation of the
colonized
populations and their
territories, and
oftentimes the
breaking of land
treaties and accords
with local rulers; and
(b) the assumption of
Europe’s
civilizational
superiority and its
“civilizing mission.”
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was the passing of a law in 2005 that made it compulsory for French high
school teachers to include the “positive aspects” of colonialism in their teach-
ing (Loi n 2005-158).7 Similar tendencies can be observed in other Western
countries. In a 2018 article, Lily Gardner Feldman writes: “By comparison
with the Nazi past, Germany’s efforts to confront its history of colonialism
in Africa are in their infancy.” If the acknowledgment of responsibility for
colonial crimes is insufficient at the national level, it is all the more so at the
pan-European level. In terms of the prerequisites for symbolic as well as
factual atonement, the EU has done little in comparison to its reaction to
the consequences of other wars and genocides in Europe. Neither the restitu-
tion of cultural artefacts that today decorate the museums of the Western
metropolises, nor reparation payments to the descendants of the original
inhabitants of colonized regions who suffered as a result of slavery or the
countless massacres carried out in the course of imperial wars, have been
on the EU’s list of priorities to address. Were the same standards applied as
with the reparation payments awarded after the two world wars, or with
the entitlements of Holocaust victims and forced laborers, the sums would
of course be enormous (Vuckovic 2003). This is arguably not the only
reason why the EU has remained curiously quiet about the crimes of the colo-
nial past. But it raises the question of how solid the foundations of the dis-
course and practice of “Normative Power Europe” (Manners 2002; Pace
2007; Staeger 2016) are on which the EU can claim its own difference in inter-
national politics. To be able to investigate this question, we need to know
more about how the EU has officially dealt with its own past, or in other
words, we need to know more about the EU’s memory politics.
European memory politics – A case of atonement?
Since the 1990s the EU has started to become an active player in memory poli-
tics. Recognizing that European citizens cannot “fall in love with a market” –
as famously observed by former Commission president Jacques Delors (1989)
– European policy makers had started to increasingly invest in initiatives that
had the power to develop the feeling of a common belonging. The memory of
World War II and the Holocaust in their role as “negative founding myths”
received special attention in this context. Within a few years the European
Parliament passed several resolutions specifically addressing World War II
and the murder of European Jews (in 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006,
2009). The second resolution in 1995 declared the 27th of January as a Euro-
pean-wide day to commemorate the Holocaust, making it, together with
“Europe Day,” one of the few European commemoration dates that are
being celebrated transnationally. The unitary Western European
6 On the French case,
see Bancel,
Blanchard, and
Vergès (2003). The
suppression of the
French colonial past
in Nora’s “realms of
memory” is
underlined by
Anderson (2005).
7 The law was
partially repealed in
2006 after heavy
protests.
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representation of World War II and the Holocaust was challenged as soon as
the EU enlarged to the East in 2004. For many of the so-called “new member
states,” the end of World War II had not meant liberation from dictatorship
but the beginning of a new period of repression. Political representatives used
the different EU forms to lobby for the recognition of their suffering under
Communist rule. Despite the heated discussions about the sought-after
equation of all totalitarian regimes, which in the minds of many Western poli-
ticians opened the doors to revisionism and came close to a falsification of
history, a second European-wide remembrance day was added in 2009. The
“Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian
regimes” was arguably more than a simple concession to the Eastern Euro-
pean member states. It was, to date, the most explicit positioning of the Euro-
pean Parliament towards the issue of memory in the EU (Sierp 2014).
While the above described processes can be classified as instances of atone-
ment (dealing with the past through – assumed – forgiveness), it might have
been precisely this limited focus on the European totalitarianisms and the
thesis of the singularity of the murder of the Jews that has narrowed the
overall perspective. By reducing European historical memory to Nazism,
National Socialism, Fascism and Stalinism and by elevating them to the
level of a negative foundation myth, incentives aimed at critically examining
persisting negative stereotypes were reduced. The fact that the non-affirmative
comparison between the Shoah and colonial genocide is a taboo (Leggewie
2011) ultimately underpinned a hierarchy of victims, assuming in its worst
form racist stereotypes and translating into the above described form of
amnesia concerning colonialism.
This is not new, of course. Historically, the vision of Europe as a homo-
geneous civilization as well as a geopolitical space was created by reaction
to external enemies. Initially, Christian Europe was set against Islam (see
Aydın-Düzgit et al. in this special issue), then the white, imperial and “civi-
lized” Europe against a “savage” and racially “inferior” colonial world,
and finally during the Cold War an economically capitalist and politically
liberal-democratic West against a communist, economically backward East
(Pocock 2002, 55–71). According to the philosopher Norbert Elias, the
awareness of a shared European past is nothing more than the expression
of the “self-consciousness of the West” (Selbstbewußtein des Abendlandes)
that is built on the tradition of orientalism, colonialism and anti-communism
that shaped the history of the continent. It expresses the
self-assurance of peoples whose national boundaries and national identity have for
centuries been so fully established that they have ceased to be the subject of any par-
ticular discussion, peoples which have long expanded outside their borders and colo-
nized beyond them. (Elias 1994, 7)
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In other words, the vision of Europe as a receptacle of civilization reunifies its
different national components, beyond their specificities and antagonisms,
opposing them to an external menacing world. “To a certain extent,” Elias
writes, “the concept of civilization plays down the differences between
peoples; it emphasizes what is common to all human beings or – in the
view of its bearers – should be” (1994, 7).
Whether one agrees with Elias or not, what remains is the recognition that
the memory of Europeans as perpetrators of colonial crimes seems to remain
excluded from this shared past. Historians have concentrated on European
wars and European problems: Fascism and National Socialism, Mussolini,
Hitler and Stalin. Research on those aspects of European history has by far
outweighed research on colonialism despite the fact that the EU Horizon
2020 work programme “Europe in a changing world – inclusive, innovative
and reflective societies” clearly calls for and makes – albeit limited – money
available for research also into colonial legacies (Commission 2016). The
EU has largely followed this pattern by concentrating its remembrance
efforts for decades almost exclusively on the experience of Nazism, Fascism,
National Socialism and Stalinism.
One of the most recent examples of this is the House of European History –
an initiative by the European Parliament – that opened its doors in May 2017
to visitors.8 Its way of dealing with the history and memory of colonialism has
undergone several transformations from its first Conceptual Basis in 2008 to
its current exhibition. While the 2008 Conceptual Basis contains a number of
highly problematic statements reproducing the colonialist point of view and
depicting colonialism exclusively in a positive light (Committee of Experts
2008), the revised 2013 concept provides more context. Still, it placed coloni-
alism in the section on European “ascendancy” suggesting that colonialism
was an integral and beneficial part of Europe’s political and economic devel-
opment (European Parliament 2013a). The final exhibition distances itself
from both concepts and portrays colonialism as the dark side of Europe’s
ambition to rise to world power in the nineteenth century. Among other
objects it features a statue of a sailor with a gun, which was created by an
unknown African artist in the sixteenth century, demonstrating that the view-
point of others with respect to Europeans has not always been flattering. The
exhibition text notes: “Abuse and inequality were excused as a necessary part
of ‘civilising savage peoples’. The gradual ending of slavery was followed by
new forms of intolerance and racism” (House of European History 2018).
Despite this evident transformation of the exhibition concept, the museum
director Constanze Itzel nevertheless admits in an interview with “EUROM
– European Observatory of Memories” (2017) that the history and memory
of colonialism does not receive sufficient attention in the museum. Consider-
ably more space is being given, for example, to the Holocaust, which in the
Conceptual Basis of 2013 is described as “constituting the nucleus of the
8 The House of
European History is
officially independent
from the European
institutions.
However, it was an
initiative by the then
president of the
European Parliament
Hans Gert Pöttering
and is funded by both
the European
Parliament and the
European
Commission.
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European discourse of memory” (European Parliament 2013a, 33–35). Ato-
nement seems to be the mechanism that applies to certain elements of the EU’s
history – those that have been elevated to form the EU’s negative founding
myth – while for others, amnesia and redirection play a greater role.
Indeed, in a study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on
Culture and Education, “Europe for citizens – towards the next programme
generation,” published in May 2018, it came to the conclusion that:
“Although the past is often appealed to in official EU discourses, the difficult
pasts in Europe, such as colonialism, are usually not discussed” (Pakier and
Stråth 2010), with the exceptions of World War II and totalitarian regimes
(Mäkinen 2018, 30).
Even if the memory of colonialism does not feature prominently in either
political speeches or exhibitions on Europe, it does not mean that European
politicians are completely oblivious to the evident gap in the remembrance
landscape. Since the beginning of the 2000s in particular, the European Par-
liament repeatedly issued calls to the European Commission to make funding
available for research relating to the history of slavery and colonialism (Euro-
pean Parliament 2007). The Remembrance strand of the Europe for Citizens
programme indeed deals with memories related to totalitarian regimes but
aims at “providing space for remembering also other cases of the controver-
sial pasts.” Similar to the Horizon 2020 programme discussed above, the
Europe for Citizens programme displays – despite its very narrow funding
base – at least the potential to go beyond the narrow focus of the memory
of European totalitarianisms.
The Europe for citizens programme and the memory of colonialism
With the Commission having no legal leeway to influence national remem-
brance policies, it has, since 2006, concentrated its efforts on funding projects
that “keep alive the memory of the victims of Nazism and Stalinism and
improve the knowledge and understanding of present and future generations
about what took place in the camps and other places of mass-civilian extermi-
nation, and why” (Commission 2008). Believing that an open memory culture
thrives only with citizens’ engagement, its aim is to mobilize grass-roots action
by research institutes, museums, human rights organizations and civil society
associations. During the funding period 2007–2013 it was mainly through
Action 4 “Active European Remembrance” that concrete efforts were made
to actively frame the emergence of European-wide memory initiatives. The
next generation of the programme (2014–2020) distinguishes only among
two strands: (a) “Remembrance and European Citizenship” aimed at
strengthening historical remembrance and understanding of Europe’s past
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and (b) “Democratic Engagement and Civic Participation” aimed at engaging
European citizens in the EU political process by helping them to better under-
stand EU decision-making processes and policies. With 26 million Euros per
year, it remains one of the smaller funding programmes of the European
Commission.
In preparation for the second funding cycle, the lack of inclusivity when it
comes to dealing with difficult pasts was a constant topic. In his draft report
on the Europe for Citizens programme presented on 8/9 October 2012, MEP
Hannu Takkula stressed that the following changes should be made to the
Commission proposal on the second generation of the “Europe for Citizens”
programme: it should be set on a dual legal base (Article 352 and Article 167
of the Lisbon Treaty) with the correct procedure then being co-decision, not
consent. The overall programme budget should be increased to reflect the
importance of historical memory and remembrance for European integration.
And greater attention should be paid to the legacy of colonialism within the
programme (Takkula 2012). The debates between Commission representa-
tives and MEPs preceding the presentation of the report were heated and
centred around the question of whether the wording of the programme text
did or did not exemplify all the different totalitarian regimes and when
exactly European history should be said to begin. Many MEPs considered
the present focus on twentieth-century National Socialism and Bolshevism
to be problematic because it makes European history a matter of the post-
World War I period and reduces historical complexity by obscuring the
view on broader (inter-) relations essential for the understanding of contem-
porary Europe (European Parliament 2012a). As Markus Prutsch, Research
Administrator responsible for memory politics at the European Parliament,
puts it:
The problem of radical nationalism with all ensuing consequences (wars fought and
crimes committed in the name of the nation, colonialism, etc.), for example, can be
argued to be less a child of the twentieth century but the late 18th and the nineteenth
century. (Prutsch 2012, 31)
Most debate contributions linked issues of the past to issues of the present,
seeing a connection between rising right-wing tendencies in Europe and the
evident gap in dealing with Europe’s past (European Parliament 2012a).
They argued that the repercussions of the colonial past are still widely felt
today and manifest in manifold ways, e.g. in the struggles of former colonial
powers to deal with the issue of immigration from their former colonies.
The activism of the European Parliament was not without effect. In the end,
the proposed amendments added “colonialism” in four instances to the text
by the Commission and now reads: “to keep alive the memory of the
crimes committed under totalitarian regimes, such as Nazism and Stalinism,
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as well as those committed through colonialism” (European Parliament
2012b). With its sustained focus on the future direction of the Europe for Citi-
zens Programme, the European Parliament on the one hand cemented its role
as main mnemonic actor in the EU landscape. On the other it set a precedent
for the inclusion of colonialism also in other contexts. The proposed amend-
ments (European Parliament 2013b) to the draft report on “Historical
memory in education and in culture in the EU” (Migalski 2013) added colo-
nialism in eight instances, now reading for example:
The history of Europe is inextricably linked with tragedy and the experience of
various forms of totalitarianism, such as Stalinism, National Socialism, Fascism,
colonialism, slavery, imperialism and other criminal systems which brought death
and unimaginable suffering to millions of Europeans. (11)
It also added the phrase: “The EU considers Colonialism and Imperialism as
part of European historical memory, together with the dictatorial regimes and
all crimes against humanity that have caused the deaths of human beings
throughout the history of Europe” (44). The question remains, however, to
what extent we observe an instance of “symbolic politics” (Edelman 1985)
aimed at conveying a specific message without real consequences or
whether we can distinguish a real paradigm shift from amnesia and redirec-
tion towards a form of atonement that goes beyond mere rhetoric and
includes also the memory of colonialism with all its consequences.
The memory of colonialism – Uniting or Dividing?
When analyzing the debates and discussions in the different policy forums and
the policy documents that resulted from them, it is striking to see that the stark
differences between East and West European MEPs that had dominated
almost all debates on European memory politics before 2009, ignited by the
question of equivalence of totalitarian regimes, did not play a role in the
more recent debates. Controversy remained confined to the question of
when European history starts and whether a more comprehensive approach
“beyond Nazism/Stalinism” might result in a “nationalization” of the issues
addressed. It seems as if all controversy concerning the direction of EU remem-
brance policies had subsided after 23 August, which had been declared as
European Remembrance Day. For the Central and Eastern European states,
this step had meant nothing less than the official recognition of their experi-
ences of suffering under Communism and the assurance of full membership
within the Union. It had arguably lessened any pressure to question the Com-
mission’s further remembrance activities and created space for the concen-
tration on other “shared pasts.” Indeed, within both the Parliament and the
Commission the idea that the memories of colonialism and imperialism – in
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the wide sense of the meaning – are no less “European” than the Holocaust
started to gain ground in the past eight years. The main argument put
forward by both institutions in this context is that essentially all European
countries and nations have histories that have been shaped by and are
closely interconnected through colonialism and imperialism: be it that at
certain moments in history they exercised the role of colonial and/or imperial
power, either inside or outside of Europe, or that they themselves were under
hegemonic foreign rule by another (European) power (Commission 2011;
Prutsch 2012). Indeed, several member states still have colonial possessions:
Great Britain has Gibraltar and parts of Cyprus, and Denmark has the
Faroe Islands and Greenland. In addition, France, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain have several overseas territories, linked to the EU as “Outermost
Regions” (ORs) or “Overseas Countries and Territories” (OCTs).9
The extent to which the memory of colonialism can nevertheless divide as
much as unite is being exemplified by its use in debates that deal with see-
mingly different topics. Colonialism can be used to blackmail certain
countries: “We must also draw conclusions from the fact that historically,
some Member States, particularly the old colonial powers, gave priority to
their national interests rather than those of the local citizens or the European
Union” (Färm 2011, 287). Responses to such generalizing criticism could take
on a very personal tone, e.g. when Antonio Tajani, the then Vice President of
the Commission, justified the Commission’s proposal for a new development
policy by saying:
With regard to international policy, I wish to reassure you – and I regret that Ms
Matiasand and Ms Figueiredo are not in the Chamber at present – that I have no
intention of pursuing neocolonial policies in Africa. I come from a country that
was the first to apologise to Africa for the mistakes made and the atrocities com-
mitted during the colonial era. (Tajani 2011, 40)
Tajani’s comment is emblematic for the EU’s ambivalent relationship with the
memory of colonialism. While a general realization of the importance of this
history in all its facets seems to have albeit lately but slowly entered public
consciousness, the ambitions of the EU at the level of memory politics seem
to stay behind concrete efforts to actively commemorate the crimes and atro-
cities committed during the colonial period. A real paradigm shift can thus
only be discerned on the level of intentions as exemplified by the debates in
the different policy forums, and less on the level of substantial policy initiat-
ives (i.e. the introduction of a day of remembrance for the victims of
colonialism).
The answer to the question of why this is the case might be found by
looking back at European integration history and the very beginning of the
relationship between what today is the EU and its former colonies. As we
9 I.e. the French
DOM and TOM,
Aruba, Curaçao, Sint
Maarten and the
islands of Bonaire,
Sint Eustatius and
Saba, Madeira,
Azores, Ceuta,
Mellila, to name just
a few.
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have seen above, European development policies have historically followed
the priorities of single nation-states – the former colonial powers – directing
their support towards the countries of their choice. As a result, the EU
stayed out of most issues connected to the often painful process of decoloni-
zation. The answer by the Commission after repeated calls by various MEPs
on the Commission to intervene on issues concerning the British colony of
Gibraltar is exemplary for this attitude: “The Commission would like to
remind the Honourable Member, as it has done on several occasions in the
past, that the issue of Gibraltar is a matter of exclusive national sovereignty,
where it has no power to intervene” (European Parliament 2008). The idea
that the relationship with current or former colonies is a matter of “exclusive
national sovereignty” is a clear instance of redirection and seems to have
translated also into the way the memory of the experience of colonialism is
being dealt with. As much as the European level often offers “the chance to
go beyond the limitations of national histories” (Settele 2015, 406), this
seems not yet to be the case when it comes to dealing with Europe’s legacy
of colonialism.
Conclusion
Going back to the conceptual framework by Nicolaïdis that informs this
special issue (see introduction by Michelle Pace and Roberto Roccu), it
becomes evident that European Union strategies for dealing with the colonial
past of its member states can be best described as a mixture of amnesia, redir-
ection and atonement, with amnesia and redirection clearly being the domi-
nant mode. This is largely in line with the findings of the other contributors
of this special issue and raises important questions about the weakness of
the “Normative Power Europe” (Manners 2002; Pace 2007; Staeger 2016)
discourse often used by the EU to claim its own difference in international
politics (see introduction by Michelle Pace and Roberto Roccu in this
special issue). The reason of why the EU has failed to “adequately gauge
the weight of the colonial legacy of some of the EU’s member states on the
EU’s external relations” might lie in its inability to remember and/or its con-
scious choice to forget this legacy. This neglect potentially opens doors to the
recreation, consolidation and deepening of the asymmetries and hierarchies
produced by former European colonial empires aptly described by the other
contributions in this special issue.
At the same time the findings also suggest something else, namely that the
EU has only limited power to develop and disseminate a specific narrative of
atonement for the crimes committed under colonialism as long as its memory
is used by its member states to divide rather than unite. Despite the potential
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of the colonial past to become part of an overarching European collective
memory able to contribute to the strengthening of European political identity,
steps taken by the European institutions in this direction have been minimal so
far. Ironically, it was the argumentative back-and-forth, aggressive resistance,
conflict and the need for consensus-making in the different policy forums
dealing with the next generation of EU funding programmes that hampered
a more vigorous inclusion of colonialism in the European memory landscape
going beyond a mere demonstration of intention. Interesting in this context is
that most efforts made thus far have been initiated primarily by the European
Parliament, representing the only democratically elected institution at the EU
level.
The key for understanding the reasons for this development lies in the con-
straining dissensus in EU politics that is characteristic of Vergangenheitsbe-
wältigung (dealing with the past). The example of memory politics
regarding Nazism and Stalinism shows how important the elaboration at
the national level was before it could be addressed in a more comprehensive
and encompassing way also at a European level. Maybe it is simply a question
of time before the EU’s approach to its colonial past can be described with
other words than “amnesia” or “redirection” and will move more towards
the direction of “atonement.”
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